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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court's decision not awarding attorney's

fees to the plaintiff constitute an abuse of discretion?

2.

After considering all required factors for an alimony

award, did the trial court's decision so vary from the evidence
as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion?

3.

After considering all of the proper factors in a

property division, did the trial court's actual division so vary
from the evidence as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion?

4.

Are the plaintiff's contentions on appeal so frivolous

or in contradiction to the evidence, that attorney's fees should
be assessed on appeal against the plaintiff?

iii

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Respondent differs with some of the statements of
fact set forth in the Appellant's Brief. The additional
facts are set forth below. Paragraph numbers correspond
to the numbers in Appellant's Statement of the Facts.)
5.

Plaintiff testified that she had experienced various

health problems.

On cross-examination, she conceded that her

claimed ulcer, hearing loss, and hand problems were not of
sufficient magnitude as to affect her employability in the school
lunch program.
6.

(T. 11/24/87 a.m. p.101).

Defendant's ability to earn additional income through

overtime decreased dramatically beginning in 1988.

During the

first five months of that year, the defendant had a total of 2 0
hours overtime.
15.

(6/7/88 T. p. 2).

During the marriage the parties acquired a homestead at

Elwood consisting of a house on .82 acres with an adjacent
unimproved lot of .79 acres.

Plaintiff's expert valued the home

and .82 acre lot at between $28,000.00 to $31,000.00, taking into
consideration the repairs that needed to be completed.
(Pis. Ex. #2.).
Appellant's reliance on the claimed appraisal by Reed Willis
is unfounded and outside of the record.

At the conclusion of the

November 24th trial, the court ordered that the only additional
evidence allowed would be limited to the valuation of the farm
property and the "junk".

(11/24/87 T. p.m. p. 191, 192; 6/7/88

T. p. 7).
16.

The only evidence offered by the plaintiff concerning

the value of the Bear River mobile home and property indicated a
value of between $20,000.00 and $37,000.00.

(11/24/87 T. a.m.

p. 45). Defendant's expert valued the same property at
$26,000.00.

(11/24/87 T. p.m. p. 7, 15.) The evidence cited by

plaintiff on appeal as to the appraised value of the Bear River
property by Reed Willis was inadmissible and is not a part of the
evidence in this case.

(11/24/87 p.m. T, pp. 191, 192; 6/7/88 T.

p. 7).
17.

The trial judge personally viewed and inspected the

farm property consisting of two parcels of 154 acres and 148.6
acres respectively.

The judge further viewed the Carl Hansen and

Curtis Christensen parcels and also the properties cited by
appraiser Reed Willis as comparables 1 and 2 in his appraisal.
(6/7/88 T. pp.48-49).
18.

Evidence of values appraised by Reed Willis for

household furniture and appliances was inadmissible and not
accepted nor reviewed by the court.

(11/24/87 p.m. T.

pp. 191, 192; 6/7/88 T. p. 7).
20.

The defendant was ordered to assume marital debts

totalling $58,594.49.

The monthly debt service obligation on

these amounts was $1,082.48. Additionally, a commercial note
2

with a balance of $10,844.52 was due in its entirety in January,
1988.

(R. 216 Def. Exhibits Nos. 17 and 18).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

A portion of the plaintiff's attorney's fees was paid

from joint funds leaving a balance of approximately $1600.

Using

the court's valuations in its property division, the plaintiff
was awarded a total of $79,888.00 and defendant was awarded
$77,406.00.

This creates a difference in favor of the plaintiff

in the amount of $2,482.00.

Part of the plaintiff's property is

in the form of two substantial cash payments to be made to her
from the defendant.

The court's decision to classify this as

property division which favors the plaintiff rather than as an
award of attorney's fees, does not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
2.

The Findings, Memorandum Decision, and evidentiary

records show that the court seriously weighed and considered the
required three factors in formulating its alimony award.

The

order formulated by the court was carefully crafted to ensure the
economic survival of both parties.

The amount of alimony awarded

to the plaintiff was adequate and fair under all of the
circumstances presented by the evidence.
3.

The trial court divided the property in such a way as

to award the plaintiff nearly $80,000.00 in debt free assets,
3

which were the assets of the marriage most easily convertible to
cash.

It was reasonable to allow the defendant a two-year period

in which to pay offsetting value to the plaintiff, because the
farm property is in imminent danger of foreclosure and there are
no funds immediately available.
4.

The defendant should be awarded his costs and

attorney's fees on appeal.

The appellants contentions are not

supported by the record and in fact contradict her own testimony
and that of her expert witnesses.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DESCRETION IN
NOT AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO EITHER SIDE.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated:
"The decision to make such an award
(attorney's fees), together with the amount
thereof, rests primarily with the sound
discretion of the trial court." Kerr v.
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). See
also Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah
1979); Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424
P.2d 150 (1967) .
On this point as well as in the other issues raised on
appeal, plaintiff seems to be taking the position that merely
because the trial court did not do as she requested, it abused
its discretion.

4

The trial court found as of January 11, 1988, that the
plaintiff had incurred attorney's fees of approximately $1700.00,
a portion of which was paid from joint funds accrued during the
marriage, and that the defendant had incurred attorney's fees in
excess of $2,000.00.

(R 139, 142, 147, 226 and 233). It appears

the only issue which is raised is whether the plaintiff's need
for an award of attorney's fees was so great that the court's
decision constituted an abuse of discretion.
In considering the issue of need, it is appropriate to
consider not only the income of the plaintiff but also the nature
and value of assets awarded to her.

Based upon the court's

findings of value, the plaintiff was awarded $70,800.00 in
property plus cash payments from the defendant totalling
$9,000.00.

The property awarded to plaintiff is virtually debt

free, whereas defendant was ordered to assume over $58,000.00 in
debts. The time delay making $4,500.00 due in 1989 and an
additional $4,500.00 payable in 1990 was reasonable under the
circumstances.
The court awarded plaintiff real and personal property and a
substantial cash payment in a manner that produced a $2,482.00
surplus or excess to the plaintiff.

This amount is substantially

more than the attorney's fees which plaintiff sought to be
awarded.

The fact that the court did not call this differential
5

an award of attorney's fees does not diminish the fact that the
court fashioned an equitable solution.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER CONSIDERING ALL REQUIRED FACTORS,
MADE A PROPER AND EQUITABLE ALIMONY AWARD.
Numerous Utah appellate cases hold that the trial judge must
be allowed wide latitude of discretion in matters relating to
alimony, and the courtfs judgment should not be disturbed unless
the facts show it works a manifest inequity.

Whitehead v.

Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 P.2d 987, See also Gill v. Gill,
718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986); Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah
1982).
A.

The Trial Court Considered the Proper Factors in Fixing

the Alimony Award.
This court in Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987)
held that the same three factors must be considered in fixing
alimony as appellant has cited in her brief.

Appellant's brief

tacitly acknowledges that the trial court considered these
factors, but appellant argues the court's decision manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.

When considered in light of the

evidence presented to the court, these factors show that the
court's decision was both reasonable and fair.

6

1.

Plaintiffs Financial Condition and Needs.

Plaintiff's testimony at trial was that her monthly
living expenses for herself and her two minor children were
$1,090.00.

This excludes the $259.00 house payment, which

appellant acknowledges has now been eliminated.

The court

awarded the plaintiff $197.00 per month child support for the
minor child, Sharla Munns, which support will continue through
May, 1990.

The court additionally awarded the plaintiff $197.00

per month child support in behalf of the minor child, Sheldon
Munns, which support shall continue through September, 1993 (R
138, 139, and 230). The court additionally ordered the defendant
to pay to plaintiff the sum of $3 00.00 per month alimony.
(R 231).
There was considerable testimony at trial that the
double-wide mobile home located in Bear River City had rented out
at $250.00 to $300.00 per month and could be so rented in the
future.

(T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 115.)

The plaintiff presumably has or will receive $5500.00 from
the sale of the unrecorded interest in the building lot in
Elwood.

Additionally, the plaintiff is awarded a building lot

next to the home which could be sold for $6,000.00 to $10,000.00.
Finally, the plaintiff will receive during the next two years the
sum of $9,000.00 in cash payments as a property settlement.
7

These three assets, which easily could be converted to cash, have
a value of at least $20,000.00. Assuming the stability of
present interest rates, the plaintiff could place this $20,000.00
in a federally insured savings institution and earn an interest
income of approximately $150.00 per month.
The mathematical result of these figures is as follows:
$ 394.00
$ 300.00
$ 250.00

child support
alimony
rental income

$ 150.00

interest income

$1,094.00

Total Income

Thus Judge Low was more than justified in fixing the alimony
award at the sum of $300.00. An analysis of the plaintiff's
needs shows that this amount will provide her with all of the
income which she testified she needed, even if she were not to
receive any income from her own employment.
2.

The Ability of the Party Seeking Alimony to Produce

a Sufficient Income for Herself.
The plaintiff's ability to produce sufficient income
for herself includes the ability of assets owned by her to
generate income.

Thus the court was entitled to conclude that

the assets awarded to the plaintiff could reasonably generate
approximately $400.00 per month income without dissipating any of
the principal. When this figure is added to the amount of child

8

support as fixed by the child support schedule, it shows that the
remaining amount needed by plaintiff to reach her stated income
needs of $1,090.00 per month is $296.00.

The $300.00 per month

alimony award is therefore directly on target.
The evidence at trial was undisputed that the plaintiff
is capable of part-time employment.

Appellant's brief made

numerous references to health problems of the plaintiff.

The

claims in appellant's brief overstated the extent of the problems
and did not conform to the evidence.

The following excerpt from

the transcript is useful on this point.

Defendant's counsel is

cross-examining the plaintiff.
"Q: Counsel asked you if you could go
to work for the school lunch program. In
reference to the school lunch program, does
your hearing affect your job?
A:

No.

Q:

Does your ulcer affect your job?

A:

I don't think it would.

Q:

Do your hands?

A: Well this one that I just got operated on, it
was pretty sore, but they're getting better."
(T. 11/24/87 p.101, lines 14-22).
Concerning her part-time employment with the school lunch
program, the plaintiff admitted under cross-examination that if

9

she were hired as a regular employee, it may generate as much as
$250.00 or $300.00 per month.

(T. 11/24/87 a.m., pp. 86 and 87).

The trial court would clearly have been justified in
finding that the plaintiff has the ability to produce
approximately $300.00 per month income, and that therefore her
alimony need was actually lower than the $300.00 per month
awarded.
3.

The Ability of the Other Spouse to Pay Support.

The defendant's Exhibit No. 18 as well as his testimony
at trial (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 114-118) demonstrate that the
defendant's base take-home pay is $1935.00 per month.

At the

time of trial, the debts which were ordered assumed by the
defendant plus the child support and alimony obligations left the
defendant with the sum of $258.52 for his monthly living
expenses.

This sum of $258.52 was to cover his housing, food,

clothing, fuel, insurance and personal expenses.

The Bronco

payment has now been completed, but the defendant's alimony
obligation was increased to $300.00, the net effect of these
developments is that the defendant now has a total of $410.83
from his base take-home on which he must live.

The defendant

works overtime whenever possible to create additional income in
order to survive.

However, the most recent evidence showed that

10

his income from overtime had been practically eliminated.

(T.

6/7/88 p. 7).
Throughout the proceedings the plaintiff contended she
was seeking $850.00 per month alimony.
for this figure was ever provided.

No basis or justification

When added with the child

support obligation it substantially exceeds the monthly financial
needs to which she testified.

Yet plaintiff, on appeal, claims

the defendant has the ability to pay her $850.00 per month
alimony.

Such an assertion is outrageous and indefensible.

In

light of the evidence presented to the court it is clear that the
District Judge properly considered each of the three factors
relevant to the computation of an alimony award, and crafted an
award which was both fair and reasonable.

If anyone suffers

economic hardship as a result of the court's alimony award, it is
certainly the defendant and not the plaintiff.
B. Terminating the Alimony When Social Security and
Retirement Pension Income Become Available Was Reasonable.
Addendum H of the appellant's brief clearly demonstrates
that upon attaining her 62nd birthday, the plaintiff will be
entitled to receive social security benefits in an amount of at
least $204.00 per month.
today's figures.

That is a projected amount using

The actual amount could increase due to the

defendant's earnings and contributions to the social security
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system during the next three years, or due to simple cost of
living adjustments in the benefits.
The plaintiff was additionally awarded a one-half interest
in all retirement benefits accrued during the marriage in the
Morton-Thiokol Pension Plan.

Neither of plaintiff's attorneys

has yet submitted a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to the
court, although paragraph 7 of the Decree specifies that the
court will enter such an order once it is prepared by plaintiff's
counsel (R. 231). Once such an order has been entered, the
plaintiff would be free to select from among several methods of
distribution authorized under the retirement plan.

She would not

be restricted, even though the defendant may choose a different
method of distribution or may continue employment after she
commences receiving benefits.
Addendum A).

IRC § 414(p)(3).

(Full text

Attached to this brief as Addendum B is a copy of a

letter from the Morton-Thiokol, Inc. Pension Plan computing the
defendant's retirement benefits as of September 8, 1988, the date
of the final Divorce Decree.

The computation shows that the

plaintiff would receive the sum of $626.93 per month at age 65.
The plaintiff's one-half of this amount would be $313.00 per
month.

Assuming a discount due to the plaintiff beginning to

draw her benefits at age 62, the plan can still be reasonably
expected to yield her at least $250.00 per month.
12

The criteria to be considered by the court in fixing an
alimony award are at that point in time sufficiently changed to
justify the termination of further alimony.

When the plaintiff

reaches age 62 in calendar year 1991, her needs will decrease as
one of the minor children obtains majority.

The $1,090.00 per

month need to which she testified at trial, might conceivably
reduce to approximately $970.00 per month for her and the
remaining one minor child.
Secondly, in 1991, the plaintifffs ability to produce a
sufficient income for herself increases.

A scenario of the

plaintifffs 1991 monthly income is as follows:
$
$
$
$
$
$

197.00
0
250.00
150.00
204.00
250.00

$1,051.00
plus (?)

child support
alimony
rental income
interest income
Social Security (estimate)
Morton-Thiokol Pension (estimate)
Total Income
Any income earned by plaintiff from
part-time employment

The plaintiff incorrectly argues that alimony should
supplement her income during her retirement.

The Utah Supreme

Court has previously addressed this issue as to whether alimony
should continue during retirement and has stated:
"Here, the thrust of defendant's
testimony is that she needs this
alimony in order to augment her
retirement income...
13

one of the functions of alimony is
not to provide retirement income.
We do not want to confuse alimony
with annuity." Dehm v. Dehm, 545
P.2d 525, 528, 529 (Utah 1976)
In this present case the plaintiff will clearly receive two
separate annuities in the form of social security and the MortonThiokol, Inc. Pension Plan.

All of the evidence indicates that

at age 62 the plaintiff will be able to provide for her financial
needs.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT MADE A PAIR AND EQUITABLE
PROPERTY DIVISION
The appellant's brief contains the following summary and
observations concerning review of property divisions.
"The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the duty
of the trial court is to 'make a distribution of
property and income so that the parties may readjust
their lives to their new circumstances as well as
possible.' Gardner vs. Gardner 748 p. 2d 1076, 1078.
Obviously, in order to meet this goal, the trial court
must have considerable flexibility in its
distributions•
The trial court in this case has carefully crafted a
property distribution plan which appears to benefit the
parties equally." (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36).
(Emphasis Added)
Appellant concedes that the factors which should be
considered by a trial court when it allocates property and debts
were, in fact, considered by the District court in this case.
14

Appellant asserts, however, that the District court should have
ordered all of the property and assets sold and the proceeds
divided evenly between the parties. This specious proposal
overlooks the very root of the litigation.
simply do not agree on things.

These two parties

It would be impossible to get

both sides to agree on a price at which any particular item would
be sold.

The trial court would become the referee for literally

hundreds of disputes over individual sales.
Appellant argues that the court had insufficient evidence
concerning the value of the various assets.

Trial courts must

decide matters on the evidence which is presented to them.

If

there was any inadequacy in the evidence of values, the fault
lies with the plaintiff and her counsel.

Plaintiff and her

attorney had several months advance notice that the divorce trial
would be held on November 24, 1987. On that date she and her
attorney came to court with numerous documents, including two
written "appraisals".

It was obvious that no effort had been

made to have the individuals who prepared those appraisals
present in court to testify.

Plaintiff and her attorney spent

much of the day trying to introduce into evidence documents which
were plainly hearsay.

Near the end of the trial on November 24,

the following exchange occurred.

15

"Mr. Vlahos: My only concern is values,
and I will be honest with you, your Honor.
Mr. Munns won't even give us—not even on a
gun—he won't even give me a value.
The Court: No, but he's given more
values than your client has today. I think
it cuts both ways." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p.
184, lines 5-11).
At the conclusion of the November 24 trial, plaintiff's
attorney asked the court for a further hearing at which to
present evidence.

The following exchange occurred.

"The Court: ...if Mr. Vlahos had rested
his case—I don't believe he ever had.
Mr. Vlahos: No.
The Court: —then I would deny the
motion. It may seem like a technical matter,
but I think it has to turn on technical
matters..." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. pp. 186-187).
A review of the record reveals that, in fact, Mr. Vlahos had
rested his case.

(T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 93, lines 1-2). It is

obvious that the trial court bent over backwards to allow the
plaintiff and her attorney to present evidence on the issue of
values so long as such information met the requirements of the
rules of evidence.
The evidence concerning the various assets is summarized as
follows:
1.

The family home located on a lot of .82 acres with an

adjoining lot of .79 acres was valued by the court at $30,000.
16

The only evidence presented by the plaintiff was Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2, which was a letter from a realtor fixing the value at
$28,000 to $31,000 for the home and .82 acres.

The defendant's

expert witness, Troy Miller, fixed the value for the home and .82
acres at $32,000. At the conclusion of the November 24, 1987
trial, counsel for the plaintiff agreed that there had been
sufficient evidence concerning the home and that there was no
dispute concerning its value.
"Mr. Hadfield: "...appraisals should be
limited to the junk and to the farm. We did
have a real estate broker appraisal on the
house and the Bear River City home and I
don't know that we have a dispute on that, do
we?
Mr. Vlahos: No.
The Court:
pp. 191-192)

I agree."

(T. 11/24/87 p.m.

When the parties were next in court, over six months later,
the plaintiff attempted to have her expert, Reed Willis, provide
evidence concerning the value of the home.
"Mr. Hadfield: ...I want to interpose
an objection and I'll just do it once so that
we can save time. I think I already read Mr.
Vlahos and the court from the transcript of
the conclusion of the trial where I said
we're limiting this to the farm. We don't
have a dispute on the home, the Bear River
property. Mr. Vlahos said 'No, I don't have
any dispute on those.' The court said
'That's right, we don't.' If we could limit
this to the farm property, that's what w e —
17

The Court:
Vlahos."

I think that's right, Mr.

Appellant's brief relies almost entirely on the value placed
on the home by Reed Willis. This value and any evidence
concerning it, were never a part of the evidence in this action.
Appellant's arguments in that regard are totally misdirected.
2.

The defendant valued the farm at $75,650 based on two

sales which were very close to the time of the trial and located
adjacent to the subject property.

The defendant further

testified that approximately 60 acres of the farm was
nonproductive and non-usable.

(T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 96).

At the further hearing on June 7, 1988, the plaintiff
produced Reed Willis as an expert real estate appraiser.

Under

cross-examination, Mr. Willis' opinion as to the value of the
farm property went from $190,000 down to $122,500 and then down
to $112,000 in a period of less than ten minutes.

(T. 06/07/88,

pp. 15, 16, & 20). This type of performance by an expert witness
is not likely to inspire confidence that his opinion is accurate.
Mr. Willis based his appraisal on what he claimed were three
comparable sales of property.

His comparable No. 3 was a parcel

of land near the Chesapeake Duck Club which was sold for use as a
duck hunting club.
"The Court: ...you have reminded me of
something I wanted to ask Mr. Willis. That
is, regarding this duck club. If
18

agricultural land is sold to a duck club for
duck hunting purposes, and the highest and
best use of that land is duck hunting and
agricultural as opposed to land for which is
not duck hunting, but simply agricultural,
wouldn't that increase the value of the duck
hunting club or duck hunting land?
The Witness: Yeah. But what f s happened
is out in those areas, they buy whatever
parcels come up. And they're not all
contiguous.
The Court: Still, they buy land out
there that is usable for duck hunting, where
this land, I suppose, the ducks aren't quite
as plentiful.
The Witness:
35, lines 6-19).

Right."

(T. 6/7/88, p.

"The Court: If I were hunting ducks, I
would hunt near the sloughs and Chesapeake
Duck Club as opposed to the Munns property.
The Witness:
lines 8-11).

Right." (T. 6/7/88, p. 37,

It is obvious from the foregoing exchanges that the trial
court felt that this was a rather unreliable and bizarre
"comparable".
At the June 7, 1988 hearing, rather than present any further
evidence, the defendant simply requested the court to physically
view the Munns farm property and those parcels identified by Mr.
Willis as comparables No. 1 and 2.

Plaintiff's counsel did not

object to this arrangement. Both parties and their attorneys,
along with the trial judge, then traveled to the location of the
19

farm property.

Because the Curtis Christensen and Carl Hansen

parcels adjoin the Munns1 property, they were also viewed by the
court.

The court obviously used the observations which it made

at this time in determining the value of the Munns1 farm property
as it related to the Christensen and Hansen properties and to
comparables No. 1 and 2 of Mr. Reed Willis1 appraisal.
3.

The junk vehicles and scrap metal, including inoperable

farm equipment, etc. was valued by the court at $10,000. The
defendant testified that a representative from Atlas Steel had
viewed the material and had made a bid of $10,000 for the lot.
Plaintiff's expert, Reed Willis, valued the cars, trucks, and
farm implements as scrap metal at $7,500.

He did not place a

value on the Thiokol scrap metal other than to assert that since
it was originally purchased for approximately $21,000, it must
now have a value of at least $21,000. Under cross-examination
Mr. Willis was asked if a family which purchased $5,000 worth of
groceries in a year would at the conclusion of the year have
$5,000 worth of groceries in the pantry.

Mr. Willis conceded

that this method of valuation was somewhat ludicrous.

(T.

6/7/88, p. 22). Mr. Willis further conceded that he had no idea
how much of the metal had been sold since the $21,000 purchase.
(T. 6/7/88 p. 23).
Appellant's brief at page 43 states:
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"Plaintiff's records show that defendant spent in
excess of $20,000 purchasing scrap metal from Thiokol,
and plaintiff believes that none of this scrap metal
has been sold." (Emphasis added)
This assertion is in flat contradiction to the evidence
presented at trial by the plaintiff.
"Q: Do you know whether that scrap has
even been sold?
A:
He probably sold some of it to
different people that would come and want
some scrap.
Q:

There isn't that much metal out
there now as far as you know?

A:

He's just sold the better part of
it.

Q:

The better part of it is sold?

A:

Right

" (T. 11/24/87 a.m. p. 66,

lines 12-20).
The defendant, himself, testified at trial concerning the
Thiokol scrap metal as follows:
Q:
The scrap metal that was shown on
one of the plaintiff's exhibits from Morton
Thiokol was something like 920,000 pounds.
Has most of that been sold over the years?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Do you have any idea what portion
would still remain?
A:
Well, the bad portion, I suspect.
A lot of the good stuff people has already
had their pick and took it.

21

Q:
figure.

But that's included in this $10,000

A:
Yes, sir." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 110
lines 5-17).
4.

Concerning the household furnishings, the defendant

testified that their present value was approximately $5,000,
including virtually everything in the family home in the way of
personal property.

(T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 105). The plaintiff

claimed that the personal property had a value of approximately
$780 based upon a short list containing only six items.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, p. 15). The plaintiff admitted under
cross-examination that she had omitted significant items of
personal property from her list of the property in the home.
11/24/87 a.m. pp. 88-89).

(T.

Based upon the evidence presented to

the court at trial, the court was certainly justified in fixing
the value of the household furnishings and assets at $3,000.
5.

Appellant's brief claims that a review of the exact

items distributed reveals that the plaintiff has received
properties which are not easily converted to cash. Again,
appellant's assertions are in direct contradiction to the
testimony presented by her own expert, Reed Willis.
Q: Over on page 11 again, you made an
observation that I just want to direct the
court's attention to. You feel that in order
for marketability of the three properties,
the mobile home in Bear River City would sell
easiest, the single home in Elwood would sell
22

next, and the farmland would be hardest to
sell. Is that correct?
The Witness: That—that would probably
be right." (T. 6/7/88, p. 23).
Appellant additionally claims in her brief that used farm
machinery sells better than new farm machinery and the defendant
may be able to sell some of the used farm machinery and easily
generate cash.

(Appellant's brief, p. 45). The plaintiff called

Brent Baugh as an expert witness concerning the value of used
farm equipment.

The following excerpt is from his testimony

under cross-examination.
Q: Things have been real tough the past
few years as far as selling agricultural
equipment?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, if Mr. or Mrs. Munns would
be to place items for sale at the value
listed, they may sit there for a year looking
for a buyer, wouldnft they?
A: They very well could." (T. 11/24/87
p.m. p. 27).
In both of the above instances the excerpts quoted are
evidence presented by plaintifffs own witnesses.

One other item

worthy of note is that over ten percent of the plaintifffs
property award is in the form of actual cash.

The plaintifffs

argument that the particular items awarded to her work a hardship
for her simply is not supported by any of the evidence.
23

6.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing the defendant two years in which to make the payments
for adjusting the property values,

A review of the entire

transcript and all of the exhibits makes clear that there was
absolutely no cash available for either of the parties.

The

loans which were ordered assumed by the defendant were delinquent
and the farm is in danger of foreclosure, (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p.
34).

(See Addendum C, letter of December 21, 1988 from

respondent's counsel to appellant's counsel).

The defendant is

living on approximately $410 per month plus whatever he can make
on the side, (T. 11/24/87 p.m. pp. 114-118, Defendant's Exhibit
#18).

Under these circumstances the party suffering a hardship

as a result of the court's order is the defendant, not the
plaintiff.

Producing the two required payments of $4,500 each

will, at best, be very difficult.

To argue that the cash should

have been made payable immediately is to ignore the entire
evidentiary record.
IV
THE DEFENDANT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
The appellant concedes that the trial court weighed all of
the required considerations on the issues of (1) attorney fees,
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(2) alimony, and (3) property division.

Appellant argues that

despite these proper considerations, the trial court abused its
discretion in the awards which it made.
Appellant fails to tie her claims of abuse of discretion to
the actual evidentiary record.

There are numerous claims and

assertions in appellant's brief which are in direct contradiction
to the evidence provided by the plaintiff and her experts at
trial.

Appellant quotes liberally from those portions of the

Reed Willis cippraisal which were not even allowed into evidence.
(Specifically, his valuations concerning the home, Bear River
property, and the home furnishings).

The only trace of those

aspects of his appraisal to be found anywhere in the transcripts
are the excerpts quoted by respondent in this brief wherein the
trial court cicknowledged that it would not receive evidence on
those issues.
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides
that:
"If the court determines ... an appeal taken
under these rules is...frivolous...it shall
aweird just damages and single or double
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees,
to the prevailing party."
Further, a frivolous appeal has been defined as:
"one having no reasonable, legal or factual
basis as defined in Rule 40(a)". O'Brien v.
Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987);
25

Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230,
1236 (Utah App. 1988).
Defendant-Respondent has no desire to harm plaintiff, but
this appeal threatens the defendant with financial ruin. A
foreclosure of the farm property would take approximately 8 0% of
all of the property which the defendant was awarded from the
marriage.

The defendant is living on $410.00 per month.

The

defendant must produce two payments to the plaintiff in the
amount of $4500.00 each during the next 18 months.

Due to the

total lack of any basis in the trial record for the allegations
made by appellant, respondent requests that he be awarded his
costs and attorney's fees on this appeal, said amount to be
offset against the first $4500.00 payment due to the plaintiff
pursuant to the Decree.
CONCLUSION
The trial court heard and viewed all of the evidence, and
the court's findings and decision are amply supported by the
record.

The appellant's "version" of facts does not find support

from the record or the trial court's findings.
Therefore, this court should affirm the district court's
decision, dismiss the above-captioned appeal, and award
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respondent's costs, and remand to the district court for a
determination of attorney's fees awarded on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1989.

MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

By
Ben H. Hadfield
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of this
Respondent's Brief to the following:
Kelly G. Cardon, Judy Dawn Barking
Attorneys for Appellant
3856 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
this

day of May, 1989.

Ben H. Hadfield
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requirements listed in paragraph (3) are met for periods after the close of the 1-year period referred
to in paragraph (2); except that years of service for the recipient shall be determined by taking into
account the entire period for which the leased employee performed services for the recipient (or
related persons).
(5) SAFE HARBOR.—This subsection shall not apply to any leased employee if such employee is
covered by a plan which is maintained by the leasing organization if, with respect to such employee,
such plan—
(A) is a money purchase pension plan with a nonintegrated employer contribution rate of at
least 71/2 percent, and
(B) provides for immediate participation and for full and immediate vesting.
(6) RELATED PERSONS.—For purposes of this subsection, the term "related persons" has the
same meaning as when used in section 103(b)(6)(C).
Source: New.
Amendments:

Sec. as amended
effective:

PL. 98-369, § § :?26( b)( 1),
713d)
P.L. 97-248, § 248(a)

preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting in lieu thereof
"any person who is not an employee of the recipient and".
j ^ e a b 0 ve amendment applies to tax years beginning
after December 31, 1983.
P.L. 97-248, § 248(a):

P.L. 98-369, § § 526(bXl), 713(i):
Act Sees. 526(b)(1) and 713(i) amended Code Sec.
414(n><2) by striking out "any person" in the material

Added new subsection < n) as shown above.
The above amendment is effective for tax years beginning
after December 31, 1983.

[Sec. 414(o)]
Co; REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations (which may provide rules in
addition to the rules contained in subsections (m) and (n)) as may be necessary to prevent the avoidance
of any employee benefit requirement listed in subsection im)(4) or (n)(3) through the use of—
(1) separate organizations,
(2) empoioyee leasing, or
(3) other arrangements.
Source: New.
Amendments:
PL 98-369 S^cVdVl^

Sec. as amended
effective:

P.L. 98-369, § 526(d)(1):
Act Sec. 526(dXl) added Code Sec. 414<o), above.
The above amendments are effective on July 18, 1984.

[Sec. 414(p)]
(p) QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER DEFINED.—For purposes of this subsection and
section 401 (a)(13)—
(1) I N G E N E R A L . —

(A) QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.—The term "qualified domestic relations
order" means a domestic relations order—
(i) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns
to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant under a plan, and
(ii) with respect to which the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) are met.
(B) DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.—The term "domestic relations order" means any
judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) which—
(i) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property
rights to a spouse [, former spouse], child, or other dependent of a participant, and
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community
property law).
(2) ORDER MUST CLEARLY SPECIFY CERTAIN FACTS.—A domestic relations order meets the
requirements of this paragraph only if such order clearly specifies—
(A) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant and the name
and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order,
Internal Revenue Code
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(B) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the plan to each
such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined,
(C) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and
(D) each plan to which such order applies.
(3) ORDER MAY NOT ALTER AMOUNT, FORM, ETC., OF BENEFITS.—A domestic relations
order meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order—
(A) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not
otherwise provided under the plan,
(B) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits, (determined on the basis of
actuarial value), and
(C) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which are required to be
paid to another alternate payee under another order previously determined to be a qualified
domestic relations order.
(4) E X C E P T I O N FOR C E R T A I N P A Y M E N T S M A D E A F T E R E A R L I E S T R E T I R E M E N T A G E . —

(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any payment before a participant has separated from
service, a domestic relations order shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of
subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) solely because such order requires that payment of benefits
be made to an alternate payee—
(i) on or after the date on which the participant attains <or would have attained) the
earliest retirement age,
(ii) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such payment is to begin
under such order (but taking into account only the present value of the benefits actually
accrued and not taking into account the present value of any employer subsidy for early
retirement), and
(iii) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan to the participant
(other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity with respect to the alternate payee
and his or her subsequent spouse).
For purposes of clause (ii), the interest rate assumption used in determining the present value
shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if no rate is specified. 5 percent.
(B) EARLIEST RETIREMENT AGE.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term "earliest
retirement age" has the meaning given such term by section 417(f)(3), except that in the case of
any defined contribution plan, the earliest retirement age snail be the date which is 10 years
before the normal retirement age (within the meaning of section 411(a)(8)).
(5) T R E A T M E N T

OF F O R M E R

S P O U S E AS S U R V I V I N G SPOUSE F O R P U R P O S E S O F

DETERMINING SURVIVOR BENEFITS.—To the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations
order—
'__.
(A) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving spouse of such
participant for purposes of sections 401(a)( 11) and 417, and
(B) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving spouse shall be treated as meeting the
requirements of section 417(d).
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of subsection (a) or (k) of section 401
which prohibit payment of benefits before termination of employment solely by reason of payments
to an alternate payee pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.
(6) PLAN PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO ORDERS.—

(A) NOTICE

AND DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTRATOR.—In

the case of any domestic

relations order received by a plan—
(i) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and any other
alternate payee of the receipt of such order and the plans procedures for determining the
qualified status of domestic relations orders, and
(ii) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan administrator shall
determine whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order and notify the
participant and each alternate payee of such determination.

Sec. 414(p)
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(B) PLAN TO ESTABLISH REASONABLE PROCEDURES.—Each plan shall establish
reasonable procedures to determine the qualified status of domestic relations orders and to
administer distributions under such qualified orders.
(7) P R O C E D U R E S FOR P E R I O D D U R I N G W H I C H D E T E R M I N A T I O N IS BEING M A D E . —

(A) I N GENERAL.—During any period in which the issue of whether a domestic relations
order is a qualified domestic relations order is being determined (by the plan administrator, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or otherwise), the plan administrator shall segregate in a
separate account in the plan or in an escrow account the amounts which would have been
payable to the alternate payee during such period if the order had been determined to be a
qualified domestic relations order.
(B) P A Y M E N T T O A L T E R N A T E P A Y E E I F O R D E R D E T E R M I N E D T O BE Q U A L I F I E D

DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.—If within 18 months the order (or modification thereof) is
determined to be a qualified domestic relations order, the plan administrator shall pay the
segregated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to the person or persons entitled thereto.

(C)

PAYMENT TO PLAN PARTICIPANT IN CERTAIN CASES.—If within

18 months—

(i) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic relations order, or
(ii) the issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order is not
resolved,
then the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to the
person or persons who would have been entitled to such amounts if there had been no order.
(D) SUBSEQUENT D E T E R M I N A T I O N OR O R D E R TO BE A P P L I E D

PROSPECTIVELY

ONLY.—Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations order which is made
after the close of the 18-month period shall be applied prospectively only.
(8) ALTERNATE PAYEE DEFINED.—The term "alternate payee" means any spouse, former
spouse, child or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as
having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such
participant.
(9) CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY.—In prescribing regulations under this
subsection and section 401(a)( 13), the Secretary of Labor shall consult with the Secretary.
Source: New.
Amendments:

Sec. as amended
effective:

P.L. 98-397, § 204(b)
P.L. 98-397, § 204(b):
Added Code Sec. 414(D), above.
The above amendment is effective on January 1, 1985,
except that in the case of a domestic relations order entered
before such date, the plan administrator—

(1) shall treat such order as a qualified domestic relations
order if such administrator is paying benefits pursuant to
such order on such date, and
(2) may treat any other such order entered before such
date a s a qualified domestic relations order even if such order
does not meet the
requirements of such amendments,
Special rules appear in the notes for H.R. 4280 following
Code Sec. 401(a).

[Sec. 415]
SEC. 415. L I M I T A T I O N S ON B E N E F I T S A N D C O N T R I B U T I O N U N D E R Q U A L I F I E D
PLANS.
[Sec. 415(a)]
(a) G E N E R A L RULE.—-[*]
[*] § 2004(d), P.L. 93-406, provides as follows:
"(d) Effective Date.
"(1) General rule.—The amendments made bv this section
I „
,
,
c TS
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shall applv to vears beginning atter December 31, 19/5. The
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Secretarv ot the TreasuryJ shal vprescribe such regulations as
, .
...
mav be necessarv to carrv out the vprovisions oi this vparagra
P '
"(2) Transition rule for defined benefit plans.—In the case
of an individual who was an active participant in a defined
benefit pian before October 3, 1973, if—
"(A) the annual benefit (within the meaning of section
415(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) payable to
such participant on retirement does not exceed 100 percent
of his annual rate of compensation on the earlier of u)

October 2, 1973, or (ii) the date on which he separated from
employer,
.
„ . .
*. •
^.^
,. „„ .
.
4„m
(B) such annual benetit is no greater than the annual
,
,. , . , n , , • n , _
°n,, tn „, , nn. • • „,
benefit which would
have been pavaole
to such participant
•
. - r . ,, ., .
„-,
, • „, Z- ~,.„u „u„
on retirement n (l)
all the terms and conditions ot such plan
.
, , „ , , _ • , • tt .r„„„Q
in existence on such date had remained in existence
until
such retirement, and (ii) his compensation taken into
account for any period after October 2. 1973. had not
exceeded his annual rate of compensation on such date, and

t h e s e r v i c e 0I l n e

"(C) in the case of a participant who separated from the
service of the employer prior to October 2, 1973. such
annual benefit is no greater than his vested accrued benefit
as of the date he separated from the service.

[The next page is 4383-23.]
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MORTON THIOKOL, INC. PENSION PLAN
ABOUT YOU

Name.

/

5*

Social Security Number
Benefit Service Date

M/A/AJS

<f /H3~
.Birth nato

O
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/ - tYY

%-V-Atf

. Vesting Service Date
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Accrued Benefit Calculated as of _

ACCRUED
BENEFIT
INFORMATION

The amount of your Accrued Benefit per month payable as a Life Annuity
commencing at age 65 is $ (OO-ICJ.
—

X
•

You are 100% Vested in this Accrued Benefit
You are 0% Vested in this Accrued Benefit and will be 100%
vested on
This Accrued Benefit assumes that you will not choose to have 50% of your reduced pension payment
continued to your spouse after your death Theamountof benefit which you may receive under the Plan will
depend on when your pension payments begin and the method of paymentyou elect If youdieafteryouare
100% Vested but before your pension payments begin and you do not have an eligible surviving spouse your
survivor will not be entitled to a benefit You should refer to the Pension Plan section of your Employee
Benefits Hand Book for more details on this plan
Although every effort has been made to assure the accuracy of this statement it is subject to correction for
any errors and benefits will be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Retirement Plan Document
If any statement does not appear correct or if you wish to review the Plan records you should contact
the Personnel Department
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December 21, 1988
Mr. Kelly G. Cardon
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Munns vs Munns

Dear Kelly:
I am writing in response to your letter of December 12,
1988, wherein you requested that Shelley Munns consent to the
proposed sale of the Bear River City property which was awarded
to your client.
The Bear River City property is presently titled in the name
of Shelley Munns. I have an executed quit-claim deed in my file
transferring title to your client pursuant to the divorce decree.
Mr. Pere Vlahos was provided quit-claim deeds on the farm
properry which the decree awarded to Shelley. We would very much
like to see the deeds exchanged so that both parties can do
whatever they find necessary to preserve these assets or utilize
them as needed. The farm is in danger of foreclosure because of
arrearages on the trust deed. Shelley cannot refinance so long
as the appeal is pending.
If you can persuade Mary to drop at least that portion of
the appeal disputing the property division and allocarion of
debts, we would be more than happy to provide you with quit-claim
deeds to all of the real estate which was awarded to Mary. In_
exchange, of course, we would require quit-claim deeds on the
real estate which was awarded to Shelley. If Mary refuses this
proposal, her present: sale may be lost, the farm may be lost, and
everyone, including Mary, will suffer. Would you please try to
reason with her on this.
Very truly yours,
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

By.
BHH/pj
cc: Shelley Munns

